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Abstract 
This study uses the VAR-BEKK methodology to examine the relationship between equity returns and currency 
exposure for a sample of U.S., U.K. and Japanese banks and insurance firms during 2003-2011.  The findings indicate 
that banks’ equity returns are negatively related to changes in foreign currency value during the recent financial 
crisis (2008-2011).  That is, the U.S. (Japanese) banking sector is negatively correlated to changes in the Japanese Yen 
(U.S. dollar).  Looking at the insurance sector, the U.S./U.K. insurers are negatively linked to changes in the value of 
Japanese Yen, and this relationship is accentuated during the crisis.  Home currency exposure is not significant for 
any insurer.  When size is taken into account, only small U.S. banks are exposed to home currency changes, while 
only large Japanese banks are exposed to foreign currency changes.  Overall, the negative relationship between the 
foreign currency value and bank/insurance equity returns supports the “flight to quality” hypothesis from the 
U.S./U.K. to Japan. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, foreign currency fluctuations along with their impact on 
equity markets received little attention.  In the post-Bretton Woods era, currencies began to float freely against each 
other driven by demand and supply in global markets.  Since then, the impact of currency fluctuations has received 
greater attention (Shapiro 1975; Flood and Lessard, 1986; He and Ng 1998; Bredin and Hyde, 2011).  The currency 
effect on financial institutions’ performance has been examined by scholars focusing on U.S. banking (Grammatikos 
et al., 1986; Choi et al., 1992; Wetmore and Brick 1994, 1998),  Japanese banking (Chamberlain et al., 1997) as well 
as the insurance industry (Mange 2000; Elyasiani et al., 2007). Typically the extant literature focuses on large 
institutions, given that these are more likely to be international in focus and therefore potentially more exposed to 
currency risks.  Yet, such firms may also engage in greater currency hedging activities given their access to exchange 
and over-the-counter currency derivatives – so this could mitigate such risks.        
The contribution of the current study to the published literature is threefold.  First, we examine the currency 
sensitivity of financial institutions across major geographical regions (Europe, Japan and U.S.) and types of 
institutions (banks and insurers). Doukas et al. (1999) and Grant and Marshall (1997) among others, have focused on 
either different types of institutions within a country or the same type of institutions across countries, although (to 
our knowledge) no study to date does both1.  Second, we use an alternative estimation framework, namely the VAR-
BEKK model.  This framework captures the time-varying conditional variance-covariance among asset returns, while 
increasing estimation efficiency (simultaneous estimation of return and variance-covariance).  Finally, unlike previous 
studies that focus on home currency fluctuations, this paper looks at both home and foreign currency sensitivity of 
bank/insurance equity portfolio returns.   
With regard to the latter, we test for both home and foreign currency effects2. The changes in currency values 
across markets mirror investors’ preferences towards different currencies. Financial assets are usually traded in 
home currency terms and thus the need to obtain that currency is apparent3.  In addition, according to the “flight to 
quality” hypothesis (Lang and Nakamura 1995; Eichengreen et al., 2001; Vayanos 2004) investors are likely to 
reallocate their investments from risky to safer ones4.  Therefore, changes in currency values can mirror investors’ 
preference across countries.  Secondly, investor’s preferences represented by home currency effects may be difficult 
to detect.  Chow et al. (1997a) argue that due to effective hedging activity, the impact of home currency variations  
                                                             
1
 See Doukas et al (1999) and Grant and Marshall (1997) using Japanese and U.K. institutions; Chamberlain et al (1997) for banking firms in the U.S. and Japan; 
Martin (2000) for major banks in Japan, Switzerland, the U.S. and the U.K.; and Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) using banks from Japan, Germany and the U.S. 
2
 Home (foreign) currency effect is defined as the relationship between the equity returns of a financial institution and its home (the foreign) currency value 
fluctuations measured as the return of a trade weighted currency price index.  The latter is a basket of currencies from 21 industrial countries constructed by the 
Bank of England. 
3
 This is based on the “asset approach” hypothesis first introduced by Branson (1983) and Frankel (1983).  Empirically, the studies by Kanas (2000) and Froot and 
Ramadorai (2005) support this argument.  Froot and Ramadorai (2005) refer to the relationship between supply/demand of a currency and the currency value as 
the “flow-centric” view.  The “flow” refers to the order flow for a currency from major currency traders.  The empirical evidence show the order flow information 
is significantly related to currency value. 
4
 Oetzel et al (2001) show that the stability of a country’s currency value is related to the country’s economic risk level, which is represented by four different 
measures in their study: Institutional Investor Index, country risk rating from Euromoney, data from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), and risk level from 
Political Risk Services (PRS).  Naes et al (2011) tests and supports the flight to quality hypothesis across countries.  
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on firm’s equity value is weak or even undetectable, especially in the short-run.  Thus, a model using only home 
currency fluctuations may fail to detect the existence of a “flight to quality” effect. 
A multivariate VAR-BEKK model comprising: a VAR system of conditional mean equations for sector portfolio 
returns; and a conditional variance-covariance estimation framework with a BEKK parameterization is employed for 
the current study.   The sample period is 2003-2011 (1st quarter) and focuses on the U.S., U.K. and Japanese banking 
and insurance industries.  Equally weighted portfolios are constructed for the banking and insurance firms. The 
conditional mean equation of portfolio returns is specified as a function of market, interest rate, home and foreign 
currency-related risk factors.  The currency-related risk factors, including both the changes and variability of currency 
values, are included as covariates in explaining returns.  A structural break is introduced into the VAR-BEKK model in 
order to investigate the effects of the recent financial crisis on the relationship between fluctuating currency values 
and the returns of banks and insurance firms. 
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the impact of foreign currency on banking portfolios has 
changed after the recent financial turmoil.  Changes in the value of the U.S. dollar (JPY) have a negative influence on 
large Japanese (U.S.) bank returns providing support for the ‘flight to quality’ hypothesis.  Equity returns for U.K. and 
U.S. insurance firms are negatively related to changes in the value of JPY.  This relationship is accentuated during the 
recent financial crisis.  The returns of the insurance portfolios are unaffected by home currency exposure, but foreign 
currency exposure has a significant impact on the U.K. and U.S. insurers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow.  Section 2 provides a summary of the literature investigating 
the relationship between currency exposure and the returns of financial institutions.  Section 3 describes the data 
and estimation framework used to test our research hypotheses.   Section 4 presents the results of the empirical 
analysis and  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
This section presents a summary of recent studies into the relationship between currency fluctuations and equity 
values5.  The literature is categorized according to whether it focuses on the currency exposure of financial 
institutions, firm size effects or alternative modeling approaches. 
 
2.1. Currency Exposure of Financial Institutions 
One of the early studies by Grammatikos et al. (1986) shows that foreign currency denominated gaps on banks’ 
balance sheet are responsible for their FOREX exposure during 1976-81.  Banks are highly exposed to individual 
foreign currencies but not at an aggregate level.  They argue that the low aggregate currency exposure of U.S. banks 
is due to diversification effects given the low/negative correlations among foreign currencies6. 
                                                             
5
 To keep the task manageable, this section presents a brief overview of some of the empirical findings with no intention to lessen the importance of any studies 
excluded.A detailed survey is beyond the scope of the current study. 
6
 The study investigates the U.S. banks’ exposure to five different foreign currencies (Canadian dollar, German mark, French franc, GBP and JPY).  The currency 
exposure is measured as the relationship between bank’s wealth and changes in the net position for each of the five foreign currencies.  Individual (aggregate) 
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Most of the subsequent literature tends to focus on the currency exposure of large banks7.  Wetmore and Brick 
(1994, 1998) investigate the currency exposures of the 79 largest U.S. banks during 1986-95.  Both studies conclude 
that the main source of currency exposure results from un-hedged foreign loan activities.  Chamberlain et al. (1997) 
support this argument when evaluating the currency exposure of the largest U.S. (30) and Japanese (89) banks during 
1986-93. Their findings indicate that currency exposure is negatively related to the volume of hedging activity, as 
measured by the nominal value of off-balance sheet items (interest rate and foreign exchange derivates).  This 
argument is dismissed, however, by Choi and Elyasiani (1997) who provide empirical evidence based on the 59 
largest U.S. banks over 1975-92. They show that hedging activity (gauged by the level of off-balance sheet activity) 
could increase systemic risk – especially when hedging is via currency derivatives.  Martin (2000)  examines the 
currency exposure of the world’s 30 largest banks from 1994 to 1996.  He finds that over 40% of the banks were 
significantly exposed to changes in the value of their home currency.  The currency exposure of the U.S. banking 
sector, however, was found to be insignificant during the sample period suggesting that U.S. banks were more risk 
averse or their hedging was more effective. 
In contrast to the attention paid to banks, few studies have examined the currency exposure of insurance 
companies.  Mange (2000) was the first to demonstrate, theoretically, how fluctuations in the value of the home 
currency influences the equity value of insurance firms.  He shows that both life and non-life insurance companies 
may be exposed to currency risk through issuing insurance products in foreign markets.  This is true when they are 
issuing long-term products.  Elyasiani et al. (2007) provide the first empirical study into the currency exposure of U.S. 
insurance firms using data spanning 1991 to 2001.  They find a significant and positive relationship between changes 
in the trade weighted USD price index and the returns of U.S. insurers.   
 
2.2. Firm Size and Currency Exposure 
Given that large companies are more likely to engage in global activity, then that makes them prone to a greater 
currency risk exposure (Jorion, 1990).  Greater currency exposure for large firms, however, may be mitigated if there 
are significant economies of scale in currency hedging activity.  Nance et al. (1993) argues that hedging vehicles are 
more likely to be deployed by companies that benefit from economies of scale due to the associated transaction 
costs.  Based on 169 firms from Fortune 500 (in 1986), they find that firms making greater use of hedging 
instruments are usually large, a finding  later confirmed by both Mian (1996) and Crabb (2002).   
Size effects have not been extensively explored in the literature.  Tai (2000) evaluates the potential size effect 
among commercial banks in the U.S. market during 1987-98.  His sample (31 banks)  reveals that currency exposure 
is only significant for large banks – reinforcing Chamberlain et al.’s (1997) findings.  This view is questioned, by Choi 
and Jiang (2009) who claim that the currency exposure of internationally oriented firms, operating in the U.S. during 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
currency exposure refers to the changes of the USD against another currency (all five currencies).  The largest/lowest correlation is between the Canadian 
dollar/GBP and the German mark (30% / -29%). 
7
 Chamberlain et al. (1997) suggest that research should focus on large banks for three reasons: 1) large banks are more likely to be involved in international 
activities; 2) large banks are more likely to be comparable in size across national markets; and 3) large banks contribute most to systemic risk. 
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1983-2006, is less than that of purely domestic-focused companies.  Using multinational corporations (MNCs) and 
non-MNCs, they find that the non-MNCs currency exposure is significantly higher than that of MNCs and argue that 
the latter are more likely to hedge foreign exposures compared to non-MNCs – a result consistent with the findings 
of Crabb (2002).  More recently, Bredin and Hyde (2011) investigate the sources of foreign exchange exposure of 
industry level portfolios in the G7 and conclude that such exposure increases with the level of trade openness and 
competiveness. 
 
2.3.  Modeling Firm Currency Exposures 
Early studies use linear modeling approaches and employ price levels (rather than changes) as exogenous risk factors 
(Adler and Dumas, 1984).  Linear estimations, however, can be biased as they do not take into account the non-
stationarity of exogenous variables.  As a result some studies employ changes in values (Adler et al., 1986).  Jorion 
(1990) argues further that a market risk factor should also be included in such models.  Prasad and Rajan (1995) 
suggest that changes in interest rates should also be included given the evidence of a strong link between interest 
rate fluctuations and firm value.Staikouras (2003, 2006) provides a survey on the interest rate risk exposure of 
financial intermediaries.  Elsewhere, others suggest that firm’s value only reacts to unexpected changes in currency 
value (Chow et al., 1997a, 1997b).  Tai (2000) and Koutmos and Martin (2003), for instance, propose the use of 
estimated residuals from an autoregressive model to represent the unexpected changes in risk.  Unlike previous 
studies, Kolari et al. (2008) and Choi and Jiang (2009) adopt an alternative specification by adding the home currency 
changes to the Fama and French (1993) model to evaluate currency exposure. 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1.  Data 
The sample period starts on January 1, 2003 and finishes on March 31, 2011 providing us with 1,924 daily 
observations after accounting for non-trading days.  The focus is on the U.S., U.K. and Japanese banking/insurance 
industries.  Equally weighted portfolios are constructed for the banking and insurance firms.  These firms are later 
split to form size portfolios when enough companies are available (e.g. Japanese and U.S. banks).  Given our annual 
rebalancing, institutions in the top quartile comprise the large firms while the remaining institutions are categorized 
as small.  Furthermore, for each country the market index and long-term government bond yields are collected, 
while trade weighted currency price indices for the JPY, GBP and the USD are constructed by the Bank of England.  
These variables form the set of exogenous risk factors.  All data information is provided by Thompson Reuters.  Table 
1 provides some descriptive statistics for our sample. 
 
TABLE 1 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root test (ADF) indicates that all portfolio returns are stationary series.  In general, 
the mean returns are negative for all the banking portfolios.  Japanese banks have performed relatively better than 
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their U.K. and U.S. counterparts.  The average daily return of the Japanese banking sector is -0.023% over the sample 
period, compared to -0.051% and -0.035% for the U.K. and U.S. banking sectors, respectively.  These results reflect 
the losses generated by banks during the crisis.  According to Guillén (2009) the crisis starts at the beginning of 2007 
when the sub-prime industry in the U.S. market began to collapse with more than 25 sub-prime lenders declaring 
bankruptcy during February and March.  The peak of the crisis is generally viewed as the 15 September 2008 when 
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.  Therefore, we calculate the pre/post-crisis average daily return for 
bank/insurance portfolios based on two dates: a) January 1, 2007 and b) September 15, 20088. While insurers were 
also affected by the credit crisis, the impact was smaller compared to that of banks.  From Table 1, one can see that 
the mean returns for all sector portfolios are positive before January 1, 2007.  After then the average daily returns 
are -0.10%/-0.097%/-0.083% for Japanese/U.K./U.S. banks and -0.103%/-0.032%/-0.072% for Japanese/U.K./U.S. 
insurers. One can also see that portfolio returns of all banks and insurers became noticeably worse after the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.  Of course, the differential impact of the recent financial crisis on banks 
and insurers owes much to the varying features of these institutions as well as to their exposure to credit and 
liquidity risks9.   
  
3.2.  Methodology 
A multivariate VAR-BEKK model is employed for the current study.  The VAR-BEKK model has two components: a) a 
VAR system of conditional mean equations for sector portfolio returns, and b) a conditional variance-covariance 
estimation framework with a BEKK parameterization. 
The conditional mean equation of portfolio returns is specified as a function of market, interest rate, home and 
foreign currency-related risk factors.  Currency-related risk factors, including both the changes and variability of 
currency values, are employed to explain variations in  financial institution portfolio returns (Tai, 2000; Koutmos and 
Martin,2003).  The conditional variance-covariance of portfolio returns is estimated using a BEKK framework.  Kroner 
and Ng (1998), Cappiello et al. (2006) indicate that conditional correlation among financial asset returns is not 
constant over time.  Unlike the constant correlation assumption used in Elyasiani et al. (2007), there is no restriction 
on the conditional correlations among equity returns employed in our BEKK approach.  Therefore, the chosen model 
is more flexible and provides superior estimation accuracy10.  In order to improve estimation efficiency, the model is 
estimated simultaneously for both the conditional mean and variance-covariance equations.  The estimation 
approach is based on the Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) framework, which optimizes the parameter estimation by 
maximizing the sum of the quasi-conditional log-likelihood ratios. 
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 Note that for our estimations the September 15, 2008 is employed as the cut-off point.  The second date (January 1, 2007) is only used in the descriptive 
statistics to show how much returns have changed before and during the crisis.  In that way we ascertain that the daily negative performance of financial 
institutions, during the whole period, is directly related to their poor performance over the crisis period.  
9
 For discussion on credit and liquidity risks for banks and insurers please refer to the report by The Geneva Association under the title of Systemic Risk in 
Insurance, An analysis of insurance and financial stability - www.genevaassociation.org.  See also Harrington (2009) and Eling and Schmeiser (2010) regarding the 
performance for these two intermediaries. 
10
 Using a diagonal BEKK parameterization the number of estimated coefficients is reduced and estimation efficiency is enhanced (Engle and Kroner, 1995). 
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Another point worth noting is that the foreign exchange market is occasionally subject to significant shocks.  A 
vivid example is the 2007 financial crisis when currency volatility increased noticeably (Melvin and Taylor, 2009).  In 
order to investigate the potential influence of the crisis on the relationship between fluctuating currency values and 
the bank/insurance equity returns, a structural break is introduced into the VAR-BEKK model.  Failure to capture the 
time series structural break could generate biased coefficients (Levi, 1994).  It is known by now that the currency 
exposure of financial institutions is time-varying, especially when systemically important events occur.  For instance, 
Choi et al. (1992) show that the currency exposure of U.S. banks changed noticeably after the establishment of the 
1979 International Banking Act.  The current study introduces slope-dummy variables into the model to capture 
potential changes in currency exposure during the financial crisis11.  According to Melvin and Taylor (2009), the 
bankruptcy announcement made by Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 had a significant impact on the foreign 
exchange market and as such this date is used as the cut-off point12.  Figures 1-2 illustrate the noticeable changes, for 
both the level of the three currency price indices (figure 1) and their conditional volatilities (figure 2) during the 
entire sample period. 
FIGURES 1-2 
In addition to the above, the effect of trading hours under different time zones13 should not be ignored.  It is 
reasonable to assume that information generated from the Japanese and U.K. markets is likely to influence the 
performance of the U.S. market on the same trading day.  For the U.S. market, however, its daily price information 
can only affect the performance of the Japanese and U.K. markets on the following trading day.  Similarly, for the U.K. 
it is assumed that its daily price movement can only affect the Japanese market on the following day.  On this basis, 
lag values are employed to capture any spillover effects due to non-synchronous trading among geographic regions. 
Given all the aforementioned information, the proposed VAR-BEKK model can be now illustrated, in matrix 
format, as follows. 
Conditional mean equation: 
        
       
        
         
          
        (1) 
Conditional variance-covariance equation: 
             
              
     
              
                                                      (2) 
               
               
      
                
                        
superscript T  is the transpose operator 
   is the cut-off date (September 15, 2008) capturing the onset of the crisis period 
                                                             
11
 The dummy variable is only introduced into the conditional mean equation and not to the conditional variance-covariance equation.  The conditional variance-
covariance equation of the proposed model is based on a BEKK parameterization, which contains a component representing the unconditional variance-
covariance matrix of the financial sector portfolio returns.  However, the unconditional variance-covariance matrix may not change in a linear way before and 
after the structural break.  Therefore, the introduction of a dummy variable may not be suitable for representing a structural break in the BEKK model.  In order 
to resolve the issue, the estimation for conditional variance-covariance equations is separated into two sub-periods, namely the pre- and post-crisis periods. 
12
 The relative value of both GBP and USD fell markedly immediately following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, whereas the JPY a ppreciated dramatically.  
Furthermore, the conditional variances of all three currency price indices increased significantly.  The results are available upon request. 
13
 The Tokyo Stock Exchange opens at GMT 0:00 and closes at GMT 6:00.  It is then followed by the U.K. which opens at GMT 8:00 a nd closes at 16:30.  The New 
York Stock Exchange operates from GMT 14:30 until GMT 21:00. 
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Rt = a [n x 1] matrix representing the bank/insurance portfolio returns (ri,t) over day t, while n refers to the 
number of portfolios employed. 
 = a [n x 3] matrix with the first column representing the constants, while the second and third columns 
representing market (i,Market) and interest rate (i,IR) betas for the corresponding portfolios. 
MFt = a [n x 3] matrix with the first column representing the constants.  The second and third columns 
contain the market (rmi,t) and interest rate (iri, t) risk factors over day t.  The market risk factor is 
represented by the local market index; the interest rate risk factor is represented by the unexpected 
changes (estimated residual from a fitted ARMA model) in the holding period return of a long-term 
government bond. 
FXt = a [3 x 1] matrix containing the unexpected changes in the trade weighted currency indices (JPY, GBP, 
USD) over day t.  The unexpected change is the estimated residual from a fitted ARMA-GARCH model. 
FXVt = a [3 x 1] matrix containing the conditional variances for the trade weighted currency indices (JPY, 
GBP, USD) over day t.  The conditional variance is generated from a fitted ARMA-GARCH model. 
G = a [n x 3] parameter matrix representing the equity return sensitivity given changes in home/foreign 
currency value (FX) over the whole sample period.  The elements of G are gij signifying the impact of 
currency value changes from country j on the portfolio return of country i.  The return sensitivity on 
home currency changes are represented by gi (i=j). 
Z = a [n x 3] parameter matrix representing the equity return sensitivity given changes in home/foreign 
currency variability (FXV) over the whole sample period.  The elements of Z are zij signifying the 
impact of currency variability from country j on the portfolio return of country i.  The return 
sensitivity on home currency variability are represented by zi (i=j). 
Γ = a [n x 3] parameter matrix representing the potential changes in equity return sensitivity given 
changes in home/foreign currency value (FX) over the crisis period.  The elements of Γ are ij 
signifying the impact of currency value changes from country j on the portfolio return of country i.  
The return sensitivity on home currency changes are represented by i (i=j). 
Θ = a [n x 3] parameter matrix representing potential changes in equity return sensitivity given changes in 
home/foreign currency variability (FXV) over the crisis period.  The elements of Θ are ij signifying the 
impact of currency variability from country j on the portfolio return of country i.  The return 
sensitivity on home currency variability are represented by i (i=j). 
D = a dummy variable representing the crisis period i.e. D = 0 (1) before (after) September 15, 2008. 
Ht = a [n x n] matrix representing the conditional variance-covariance matrix among the bank/insurance 
portfolio returns over day t. 
t = a [n x 1] matrix representing the error term vector from the conditional mean equations over day t. 
Cpre/post = a [n x n] upper triangle matrix representing the unconditional part of the variance-covariance 
matrix over the pre- and post-crisis period. 
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Apre/post = a [n x n] diagonal parameter matrix representing the ARCH effect of the conditional variance-
covariance matrix over the pre- and post-crisis period. 
Bpre/post = a [n x n] diagonal parameter matrix representing the GARCH effect of the conditional variance-
covariance matrix over the pre- and post-crisis period. 
 
3.3.  Joint Hypotheses 
Four hypotheses are constructed to investigate the joint-significance of parameters for risk factors representing 
home/foreign currency changes (FX) and variability (FXV).  In order to perform these joint-hypotheses tests, a set of 
VAR-BEKK models are estimated with alternative conditional mean specifications by restricting the relevant  
parameters equal to zero.  For clearer illustration, the unrestricted conditional mean equation (1) is presented in a 
scalar form as follows:   
                                                                                               (1a) 
with  i and j  [Japan, U.K., U.S.]. 
The variables and parameters used in the above equation are the elements from the variable and parameter 
matrices presented in Equation (1).  The four joint-hypotheses are presented below: 
H1:  No home and/or foreign currency variability (FXV) effect 
Restrictions   zij = ij = 0 
H2:    No foreign currency changes (FX) and/or variability (FXV) effects 
Restrictions   gij = ij = zij = ij = 0 (i≠j) 
H3:  No change in home currency (FX) and/or variability (FXV) effect during the crisis 
Unrestricted model  gij = ij = zij = ij = 0 (i≠j) 
Restricted model  gij = ij = zij = ij = 0 (i≠j)    plus    i = i = 0 
H4:  No change in home and/or foreign currency (FX) and/or variability (FXV) effects during the crisis 
Restrictions   ij = ij = 0 
  
10 
 
4. Estimation Results 
The following section presents the results from the VAR-BEKK model. First, the results of the four joint-hypotheses 
are discussed.  Second, we examine the impact of currency fluctuation on bank/insurer portfolio returns.  Finally, we 
investigate potential size effects using large and small U.S./Japanese bank portfolios.  
 
4.1.  Joint-Hypothesis Tests 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the four joint-hypotheses tests.  As discussed in Section 3, the first two (H1 - H2) 
investigate the effect of home and/or foreign currency fluctuations (FX/FXV) on banking/insurance portfolio returns 
over the entire sample period.  The remaining hypotheses (H3 - H4) examine any change in these effects during the 
recent financial crisis.  
TABLE 2 
In general, the test results provide us with three main findings.  First, the returns of bank/insurance portfolios 
are not sensitive to home/foreign currency variability (FXV) over the sample period.  Second, changes in foreign 
currency value (FX) do affect the bank/insurance portfolios returns over the sample period.  Third, the return 
sensitivity of these sector portfolios, given changes in foreign exchange (FX), has altered during the crisis period. 
The first finding (i.e. the returns of bank/insurance portfolios are not sensitive to home/foreign currency 
variability -FXV- over the sample period) comes from testing the H1 hypothesis, which examines the return sensitivity 
due to home/foreign currency variability (FXV) over the whole sample period.  From Table 2, it is clear that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected by all sector portfolios.  .  This is in contrast to Koutmos and Martin (2003) who find 
evidence of a strong and positive link between home currency variability and the performance of U.S. financial 
institutions during 1992-98.  They argue that the positive relationship is because greater variation in currency values 
induces more hedging, which increases the profit of underwriters (e.g. banks) who issues these hedging instruments 
(e.g. FOREX derivatives).  We argue that the conflict in the results is mainly due to the different sample period 
employed.  We believe that during our sample period the main concern for investors is credit risk rather than 
currency exposure.  This becomes more evident during the recent crisis.  Therefore, the trading volume of FOREX 
derivatives should only represent a small proportion of the overall derivatives market compared to credit-related 
instruments.  Even though higher variation of currency values will increase the sales of FOREX derivatives, its 
apparent impact on the profitability of financial institutions appears to be limited.  Our argument is supported by the 
report from the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE)14.  During the 8-year period from 1998 to 2006, the trading 
volume of the currency derivatives is almost unchanged.  The trading volume of credit-related instruments, however, 
has increased dramatically during the same period.  As a result, the proportion of currency derivatives dropped from 
around 25% of the total derivatives trading volume in 1998 to 8% at the end of 2008. 
                                                             
14
 The report by the WFE is under the title Derivative Trading: Trends since 1998, www.world-exchanges.org. 
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The second finding (i.e. changes in foreign currency value -FX- affect the bank/insurance portfolios returns over 
the sample period) is generated by combining the test results of H1 and H2 hypotheses.  The latter investigates 
whether foreign currency changes (FX) and variability (FXV) can affect portfolio returns.  Given that the null 
hypothesis of H1 is rejected by all sector portfolios, it is interesting to see whether foreign currency changes (FX) or 
variability (FXV) influence the return performance of bank/insurance portfolios.  We already know (H2 test results) 
that foreign currency variability (FXV) has no influential power over the bank/insurance returns.  Thus, we observe 
that bank/insurance portfolios are only sensitive to changes in foreign currency value (FX). 
The third finding (i.e. the return sensitivity of these sector portfolios, given changes in foreign exchange -FX-, has 
altered during the crisis period) is derived from the test results of H3 and H4 hypotheses.  The former investigates 
the potential change in portfolio returns upon home currency fluctuations (FX/FXV) during the crisis period; while 
the latter examines the potential change in portfolio returns upon both home and foreign currency fluctuations 
(FX/FXV).  The test results indicate that all bank/insurance portfolios reject the null hypothesis of H3 but not H416.  
That means the return sensitivity due to foreign currency fluctuations (FX/FXV) has changed during the crisis period.  
From H1, we already know that home and foreign currency variability (FXV) do not have a significant impact on 
bank/insurance portfolio returns during the entire sample period.  Therefore, only the impact of foreign currency 
changes (FX) has intensified during the crisis period17. 
 
4.2.  Currency Value Fluctuation and Bank/Insurance Portfolio Returns 
The estimation results of the VAR-BEKK model for the bank/insurance portfolios across the three markets are 
presented in Tables 3 to 6.  Table 3 summarizes the estimated parameters for the banking portfolios, while Table 4 
summarizes those for the insurance portfolios.  Table 5 and 6 presents the estimation results for large and small 
banking portfolios for the U.S. and Japanese markets.   
TABLE 3 
The results show that the relationship between changes in home currency value (FX) and returns of the 
Japanese and U.K. banking portfolios are insignificant over the entire estimation period.  Lack of significance for the 
home currency exposure could be due to hedging practices (Levi, 1994; Bartov et al., 1996; Chow et al., 1997a), while 
it is empirically established that derivatives usage can be an effective way to hedge currency exposure (Cummins et 
al., 1996; Grant and Marshall, 1997).  We noted earlier that credit derivatives have become relatively more 
important (globally) compared to currency derivatives although the latter are relatively more important for the U.K. 
banks.  Data from the Bank of England suggests that foreign currency derivatives were popular hedging instruments 
                                                             
16
 The only exception comes from the large banking sector portfolio, which we discuss later in detail – see discussion for Tables 5 and 6. 
17
 We also test two additional joint-hypotheses a) no change in home currency (FX) effect and b) no change in home and/or foreign currency (FX) effects during 
the crisis period.  Apart from large banking sector portfolio, the tests accept (a) and reject (b).  This implies that only the foreign currency (FX) effect changed 
during the crisis period, with one exception of the home currency (FX) effect for large banks.  This is in line with the reported findings and the results are 
available upon request.   
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among the U.K. banks since the turn of the millennium and especially during the crisis18.  On average, the 
outstanding volume of foreign currency-related derivatives accounted for approximately 25% of the total volume of 
financial derivatives used by the U.K. banking industry19.  We suggest that the lack of home currency exposure for the 
U.K. banks is mainly due to their effective hedging activities.  Contrary to these results, the home currency exposure 
of the U.S. banking portfolio is significantly negative over the whole sample period.  The estimated coefficient for 
home currency changes (FX) is -4.1% and statistically significant.  It is possible that the significant currency exposure 
of the U.S. banking sector is derived from activities of relatively small banks because they have less incentive to 
hedge their currency exposures due to economies of scale required for hedging purposes20.  The coefficient of the 
foreign currency changes (FX) is significant for the banking portfolios across all three markets.  Looking at the 
JPY/USD effect on the U.S./Japanese banks, it is clear that either currency is negatively correlated with bank returns 
during the crisis period.  For the Japanese banks, the estimated impact of the USD is -9.7% during the entire sample 
period, while for the U.S. banks the impact of the JPY reduces by 20.0% points over the crisis period21. 
According to the ‘flight to quality’ hypothesis, changes in currency values can be treated as an alternative 
measure of investors’ preferences.  The value of a country’s currency is related to the investors’ willingness to hold 
financial assets in this country (Branson, 1983; Frankel, 1983).  As investors shift their investments from one country 
to another, the value of these countries’ currencies should change accordingly.  Melvin and Taylor (2009) support 
this hypothesis by showing that the value of the JPY steadily increased during the global financial crisis because Japan 
did not suffer the same adverse effects as Europe and the U.S.  Interestingly, the value of the GBP and the USD fell 
following the onset of the crisis.  Under the ‘flight to quality’ hypothesis, the GBP and the USD depreciated because 
the level of economic risk in the U.K./U.S. markets increased significantly during the crisis and investors shifted their 
investments away from these two markets and into Japan.  In such an environment, the returns generated by the 
U.K./U.S. financial sectors should have an inverse relationship with the value of JPY.   As one can see from Table 3, 
the relationship between changes in JPY (USD) and returns on the U.S. (Japanese) banking portfolio is indeed 
negative supporting the ‘flight to quality’ hypothesis. 
The U.K. banking portfolio is positively related to changes in the USD with a significant coefficient for the USD - 
11.1% over the entire sample period.  This finding further reinforces the ‘flight to quality’ among financial institutions.  
The U.K. and the U.S. markets are highly connected over the sample period22 and Chiang and Zheng (2010) show that 
                                                             
18
 The derivative position for the U.K. banks is collected from the “Financial Derivative Positions of Banks at Market Value” issued by the Bank of England 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/bankstats/current/tabf1.1.xls). 
19
 In the case of U.K. banks, the most frequently used financial derivatives are interest rate-related derivatives, which account for more than 50% of total 
derivative usage in terms of market value.  The commodity- and credit-related derivatives only account for approximately 13% and 7%, respectively, of the total 
derivative volume used by the U.K. banking industry. 
20
 For the home currency effect on large and small U.S. banks see discussion for Tables 5 and 6. 
21
 It is worth noting that the estimated coefficients during the crisis period only reflect change in returns’ sensitivity to a particular risk factor.  The coefficients 
during the crisis period are percentage points rather than percentages.  In order to obtain the full magnitude of any factor’s  impact during the crisis period, one 
needs to sum up the estimated coefficient over the entire period (gij/zij) and the estimated coefficient during the crisis period (ij/ij).  In the case of Japanese 
banks, the coefficient for the USD effect remains the same and significant during the crisis period since the change in the coefficient (0.025) during the crisis is 
insignificant.  In the case of the U.S. banks, the estimated coefficient for the JPY effect is insignificant over the entire sample period , but the change in the 
coefficient (-0.200) during the crisis is significant. 
22
 The unconditional correlation between the U.K. and U.S. wide market index returns is 53.4% over the entire sample period.  Information related to the 
unconditional correlations among the risk factors is available upon request. 
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the two countries are linked through herding behavior.  Ceteris paribus, the value of the USD will decrease when 
investors withdraw from the U.S., which in turn will negatively affect the U.K. market.  Therefore, the USD should be 
positively correlated with the performance of the U.K. market, and therefore with the banking sectors in both 
countries. 
Another interesting finding from Table 3 is that the impact of the home currency changes (FX) on the Japanese 
banking portfolio has altered during the crisis period.  The home currency (FX) effect has increased from zero to 
13.0%23, which means that Japanese bank returns are positively related to the JPY.  The reason for this change in 
home currency exposure is possibly due to large foreign loan losses incurred by Japanese banks over the crisis.  Since 
foreign loan losses are recorded in foreign currency values, an increase in the home currency value will reduce the 
impact of foreign losses in home currency terms.  Therefore, banks with large foreign losses should benefit from 
home currency appreciation. This argument is supported by the accounting data obtained from the Japanese Bankers 
Association (JBA).  The annual value of non-performing loans that were written-off by the Japanese banking sector 
increased from JPY 452,273 million in 2007 to JPY 1,409,363 million in 2009 with the largest annual increase (JPY 
750,036 million) being recorded between 2008 and 2009.   
Now our focus turns to the insurance sector.  Table 4 contains the estimated coefficients for the insurance 
portfolios.  The results indicate that home and foreign currency variability (FXV) effects are insignificant over the 
sample period.  This could be attributed to the fact that insurers are not highly involved in currency derivatives.   
TABLE 4 
Only for U.K. insurers the estimated coefficient for home currency (FX) effects (7.8%) is significant over the 
whole period.  It could be that U.K. insurers issue insurance products in overseas markets causing this effect (Mange, 
2000).  According to the information provided by the Association of British Insurers (ABI), around 20% of the net 
premium income of U.K. insurance sector derives from overseas and more than 70% of this is from sales of long-term 
products24.    
Based on the estimation results for foreign currency (FX) effects, one can see that the returns of the U.K./U.S. 
insurance portfolios are negatively linked to changes in JPY, especially during the crisis.  The estimated coefficient of 
the JPY effect on U.K. insurance portfolio is -7.0% over the entire estimation period, while the JPY effect on the U.S. 
insurance portfolio is -17.7% during the crisis.  For the Japanese market, changes in the USD have a negative and 
significant impact on the insurance portfolio returns - the estimated coefficient of the USD effect is -23.2% over the 
whole period.  Overall, the results indicate the existence of competitive effects between Japan and the U.K./U.S. in 
the sense of attracting investor’s funds.  This is another shred of evidence supporting the “flight to quality” 
hypothesis. 
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 The p-value of the estimated parameter does not reach the 10% significance level but is very close.  In order to avoid the Type II error, we consider this 
parameter as marginally significant. 
24
 The information is collected from several documents issued by ABI.  The relevant documents include the U.K. Insurance – Key Facts, the Annual Invested Assets 
Overview Statistics, the Long-term Insurance Net Premium Income Statistics, and the Annual General Insurance Overview Statistics, www.abi.org.uk. 
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In addition, the GBP effect on U.S. insurers is 8.1% over the sample period.  However, this relationship has 
changed noticeably during the course of the crisis.  The estimated coefficient for the GBP effect has fallen by 12.9% 
points, namely a decline from 8.1% to -4.8% (i.e. 8.1-12.9). One possible explanation for this could be that investors 
no longer treat the equities of insurance companies in these two markets as assets with similar characteristics.  
Therefore, currency changes in one market may (in this case at least) no longer serve as an indicator of investors’ 
preferences in another.  By conducting additional tests for life and non-life insurance portfolios separately, we find 
that changes in GBP affect only the U.S. non-life insurers25.  We believe this change is attributed to the different asset 
compositions of the U.S. and U.K. non-life insurers .  Data provided by Swiss Re indicates that during the financial 
crisis the asset compositions of the U.K. and U.S. non-life insurance sectors were distinctly different26.  The U.K. non-
life insurers invested more than 15% of their assets in real estate loans, while non-life insurers in the U.S. had no 
property-related assets in 2008.   Finally, the relationship between the JPY and the U.K. insurers has changed 
significantly during the crisis.  That is, the JPY coefficient has increased by 9.9% points during the recent turmoil, 
pointing towards a relatively good performance of the U.K. insurance market compared to the Japanese/U.S. insurers. 
 
4.3.  Size Effects and Currency Risks 
The positive relationship between fluctuations in the currency value and firm size may be due to incentives to hedge 
(Mian, 1996) or the risk characteristics associated with size of an institution (He and Ng, 1998).  This section 
investigates the currency exposure of large and small bank portfolios in the U.S. and Japan.  The results are 
presented in Tables 5-6. 
TABLES 5 - 6 
Looking at large and small U.S. banks, it is apparent that small banks are exposed to home currency value 
changes (FX) over the entire sample period, while large banks are not affected.  Economies of scale required for 
hedging activities could be the reason behind this size effect.  Large companies are more likely to engage in hedging 
activities because the economic incentive for hedging is greater (Mian, 1996).  Currency volatility in either home or 
foreign currency does not seem to be a risk factor throughout the sample period.  During the financial crisis, however, 
both large and small U.S. banks are negatively affected (-27.0% and -19.5% respectively) by changes in the JPY; while 
only large U.S. banks are negatively affected (-17.1%) by changes in the GBP. 
On the other hand, changes in the USD have a significant negative impact (-15.9%) only on large Japanese banks 
over the entire sample period, while this currency sensitivity does not change during the crisis27.  It could be argued 
that, during the crisis, Japanese banks benefited from the USD depreciation (given the -0.159 coefficient), while the 
U.S. banks suffered from the JPY appreciation (given the -0.270 coefficient).  The estimated impact of the home 
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 Test results are available upon request. 
26
 The information is collected from the report by the Swiss Re under the title SIGMA – Insurance Investment in a Challenging Global Environment (2010), 
www.swissre.com. 
27
 In the case of large Japanese banks, the estimated coefficient for changes in the USD effect (0.045) during the crisis period is insignificant. 
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currency changes (FX) on large Japanese banks has increased from zero prior to the crisis to 13.0% during the crisis28.  
A plausible explanation behind this positive home currency (FX) effect is that these banks suffered greater foreign 
loan losses during the crisis as they were more involved in international business (Chamberlain et al., 1997) - when 
the home currency appreciates losses on foreign loans decrease in home currency terms.  Data from the JBA shows 
that large Japanese banks wrote-down more than twice the amount of foreign-related loans compared to small 
banks during 2008-09.  Finally, no home/foreign currency (FX) effects are observed for small Japanese banks.  The 
reason for this could be attributed to the increased liquidity premiums for such institutions.  Previous empirical 
studies, investigating the liquidity premium, suggest that small firms usually have lower liquidity compared to their 
larger counterparts (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Amihud, 2002).  One could argue that liquidity tends to 
decline during market downturns making investors even more concerned about assets’ liquidity (Hameed et al., 
2010).  That means investors would prefer to invest into large financial institutions, during crises, as they provide 
higher liquidity compared to smaller ones.  Thus, small Japanese banks are less likely to benefit from any 
depreciation in the USD compared to their larger rivals, especially during a period of financial distress.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper uses the VAR-BEKK methodology to examine the relationship between the returns and currency exposure 
for a sample of U.S. U.K. and Japanese bank and insurance firms between January 2003 and March 2011.  We find 
little evidence that the portfolio returns of banks and insurance firms are related to the conditional variance of home 
or foreign currencies. 
Looking at the banking portfolios, we find that both home and foreign currency changes affect returns and 
the latter are more pervasive.  We also find that the impact of foreign currency on banking portfolios generally 
change after the recent financial crisis.  Typically, the home currency effects on bank returns are found to be more 
important in the U.S. than in the U.K. or Japan – this is put down to the activities of relatively small banks who have 
less incentive to hedge or are otherwise limited in their currency hedging activities. 
Considering the results for insurance firms, we find that the portfolio returns of both U.K. and U.S. insurers 
are negatively related to changes in the JPY.  However, the impact of the JPY on the U.K. insurers has changed from 
negative to positive during the crisis period.  For the Japanese insurers, changes in the USD have also a negative 
impact on their equity return over the entire sample period.  Furthermore, insurance portfolios are generally free 
from home currency exposure - apart from the U.K. insurers who have extensive operations in foreign markets.   
Finally, when size is taken into account, we find that only small U.S. banks are exposed to home currency 
value fluctuation over the entire sample period.  Changes in the value of the U.S. dollar (JPY) have a negative 
influence on large Japanese (U.S.) banks providing support for the ‘flight to quality’ hypothesis.  That is, assets in the 
Japanese market benefit from USD depreciation while the U.S. banks suffer from an appreciation of the JPY.  The 
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 The p-value of the estimated parameter does not reach the 10% significance level but very close.  In order to avoid the Type II error, we consider this 
parameter as marginally significant. 
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results indicate that competitive effects exist between Japan and the U.K./U.S. in the sense of attracting investor’s 
funds.  Overall, these findings emphasize the importance of currency markets and their impact on bank/insurance 
equity returns; and gauge the impact of portfolio size as well as the recent financial turmoil. 
As a final point, the latest developments in financial markets (although credit-related) have cast doubt on the 
risk management attitude of financial institutions.  Governments and regulators across the world are currently 
working towards a safer financial system.  Future research should seek to investigate whether sector-specific 
features and/or regulatory frameworks of the markets under examination influence currency exposure relationships.  
Appropriate modeling/methodologies attenuating the nature of market data could be of vital importance.  One 
should be very broad minded, however, when analyzing both risk factors and regulatory/economic environments 
where financial institutions operate.  Any framework developed should bear in mind the dynamic market condition 
embracing financial intermediaries’ diverse activities and risk taking nature. 
17 
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Figure 1. Time series of the trade weighted currency price indices* 
 
 
 
* The trade weighted currency price index is the relative value of one currency against a basket of other currencies from 21 major industrial countries – source 
Bank of England.  The level of the currency indices has been rescaled to 100 at the beginning of the sample period. 
 
 
Figure 2. Conditional variances of the trade weighted currency price indices 
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Table 1. Banking and Insurance Portfolios Information 
 
Panel A.  Sector Portfolio Size* (Number of Institutions) 
  
Banking Sector* Insurance Sector 
Japan UK   US   Japan UK US 
Date All Small Large All All Small Large All All All 
2003 79 59 20 6 86 65 21 3 19 61 
2004 80 60 20 7 98 74 24 3 22 66 
2005 81 61 20 7 101 76 25 3 26 67 
2006 83 62 21 8 105 79 26 3 27 69 
2007 84 63 21 8 111 83 28 3 33 73 
2008 84 63 21 8 111 83 28 3 34 75 
2009 86 65 21 8 112 84 28 3 34 75 
2010 87 65 22 8 113 85 28 4 34 79 
2011 87 65 22 8 114 86 28 4 34 79 
* The large and small banking sector portfolios are rebalanced on an annual 
basis with large banks coming from the top 25 percentile while the rest are 
considered small banks. 
 
Panel B.  Sector Portfolio Statistics 
 
Daily Return (%) 
Banking Sector Insurance Sector 
Japan UK US Japan UK US 
All Small Large All All Small Large All All All 
 Mean -0.023 -0.022 -0.031 -0.051 -0.035 -0.027 -0.050 -0.006 0.004 -0.015 
Mean-Pre 0.000 0.009 -0.004 -0.025 
 
-0.019 -0.015 -0.018 0.064 0.007 0.013 
Mean-Post -0.077 -0.123 -0.066 -0.105 -0.073 -0.130 -0.049 -0.162 -0.002 -0.083 
Mean-Pre* 0.052 0.064 0.038 0.001 0.015 0.025 0.013 0.098 0.043 0.042 
Mean-Post* -0.100 -0.121 -0.080 -0.097 -0.083 -0.122 -0.065 -0.103 -0.032 -0.072 
 Maximum 13.47 13.21 15.03 15.17 13.29 13.06 15.34 12.328 5.202 10.386 
 Minimum -10.31 -10.55 -12.26 -15.34 -13.95 -12.68 -18.09 -17.58 -5.05 -16.56 
 Std. Dev. 1.55 1.49 1.90 1.85 1.45 1.27 2.29 2.44 0.84 1.76 
Distributional Properties           
 Skewness -0.081 -0.094 0.006 -0.207 -0.529 -0.821 -1.031 -0.223 -0.134 -1.019 
 Kurtosis 10.019 10.630 9.089 14.881 27.178 35.090 16.976 9.301 7.097 17.535 
Normality Test 3958 4677 2977 11348 47028 82898 16024 3204 1354 17296 
ADF Test -44.62 -44.89 -43.81 -43.18 -
22.343 
-22.41 -
22.835 
-
43.559 
-
42.642 
-
23.928 The Mean-Pre/Post represents the average daily portfolio returns before and after September 15, 2008.  This date 
signifies the collapse of Lehman Brothers and is used as our cut-off point (structural break) for our estimations. 
The Mean-Pre*/Post* represents the average daily portfolio returns before and after January 1, 2007.  This date is 
only used for this table to ascertain that the daily negative performance of many financial institutions, during the 
whole period, is directly related to their poor performance during the crisis. 
The normality test is conducted following the Jarque-Bera test.   
The ADF Test refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test.  
The test statistics are all highly significant at 1% level. 
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Table 2.        Joint-Hypotheses Tests 
The following table summarizes the test statistics for the four joint-hypotheses tests designed to 
investigate the joint-significance of the estimated parameters for the FX and FXV risk factors.  For 
each hypothesis test, the test statistics are calculated for banking/insurance portfolios across market 
and sizes. 
  All Banks All Insurers Large Banks Small Banks 
H1 No home and/or foreign currency variability (FXV) effect 
D.F. 18 18 12 12 
Test Stat. 0.00 12.00 0.00 0.00 
Sign. Level -- -- -- -- 
H2 No foreign currency changes (FX) and/or variability (FXV) effects 
D.F. 24 24 16 16 
Test Stat. 64.00 42.00 36.00 70.00 
Sign. Level *** *** *** *** 
H3 No change in home currency (FX) and/or variability (FXV) effect during the crisis 
D.F. 6 6 4 4 
Test Stat. 10.00 2.00 8.00 6.00 
Sign. Level -- -- * -- 
H4 
No change in home and/or foreign currency (FX) and/or variability (FXV) effects 
during the crisis 
D.F. 18 18 12 12 
Test Stat. 44.00 38.00 26.00 52.00 
Sign. Level ***  *** *** *** 
    D.F. represents degrees-of-freedom of the joint-hypothesis test, which is equal to the number of 
restricted parameters between restricted and unrestricted model. 
The Test Stat. represents the log-likelihood ratio test statistic which is the differences in log-
likelihood function value between the restricted and unrestricted model multiplied by two. 
The Sign. Level represents the significance level of the joint-hypothesis test. 
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level, respectively. 
-- denotes insignificant test statistic. 
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Table 3.        VAR-BEKK Models for Banking Portfolios 
The table summarizes the estimated parameters from the VAR-BEKK model from the conditional mean 
equation specified in Equation (1a).  Estimations are based onall size banking portfolios across Japan, U.K. 
and U.S. markets. 
 
                                                                                          
  Japanese Banks UK Banks US Banks 
 Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-Stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Mean Equation                   
Constant 0.000 -0.733   0.000 -0.430   0.000 -2.113 ** 
Market (i,Market) 0.780 38.671 *** 0.931 19.733 *** 0.480 36.94
1 
*** 
IR (i,IR) 0.014 1.548   -0.026 -0.610   0.035 4.412 *** 
FX (gi,Japan) -0.013 -0.283   0.031 0.712   -0.021 -0.914   
FX (gi,UK) -0.009 -0.139   0.047 0.683   -0.005 -0.182   
FX (gi,US) -0.097 -1.782 * 0.111 1.688 * -0.041 -1.853 * 
FXV (zi,Japan) 0.002 0.038   -0.008 -0.020   0.001 0.031   
FXV (zi,UK) -0.002 -0.055   0.001 0.028   0.001 0.023   
FXV (zi,US) 0.001 0.025   0.001 0.005   0.003 0.045   
D*FX (i,Jaoan) 0.130 1.643 * -0.172 -0.766   -0.200 -4.055 *** 
D*FX (i,UK) 0.044 0.466   -0.002 -0.007   -0.044 -0.808   
D*FX (i,US) 0.025 0.256   -0.221 -0.786   -0.029 -0.470   
D*FXV (i,Japan) -0.002 -0.015   -0.007 -0.023   0.003 0.038   
D*FXV (i,UK) -0.003 -0.006   -0.001 -0.022   0.001 0.031   
D*FXV (i,US) -0.003 -0.014   -0.001 -0.034   0.001 0.017   
Variance Equation                  
ARCH (aii
2, Pre-Crisis) 0.000 0.190   0.315 5.402 *** 0.004 0.855   
GARCH (bii
2, Pre-Crisis) 1.000 429.91
0 
*** 0.747 20.432 *** 0.994 197.6
80 
*** 
ARCH (aii
2, Post-Crisis) 0.046 4.193 *** 0.040 2.702 *** 0.146 8.396 *** 
GARCH (bii
2, Post-Crisis) 0.958 105.61
0 
*** 0.969 92.074 *** 0.874 72.99
8 
*** 
Persistence (Pre-Crisis) 1.000     1.063     0.998     
Persistence (Post-Crisis) 1.004     1.009     1.020     
Log-Likelihood 20264.
0 
                
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.        VAR-BEKK Models for Insurance Portfolios 
The table summarizes the estimated parameters from the VAR-BEKK model with conditional mean 
equation specified in Equation (1a).  Estimations are based onall size insurance portfolios across the 
Japanese, U.K. and U.S. markets. 
 
                                                                                          
 Japanese Insurers UK Insurers US Insurers 
 Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-Stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Mean Equation                   
Constant 0.000 0.318   0.000 0.550   0.000 -0.444   
Market (i,Market) 0.982 19.93
9 
*** 0.535 32.37
6 
*** 0.903 45.106 *** 
IR (i,IR) -0.019 -0.951   -0.004 -0.334   -0.013 -1.365   
FX (gi,Japan) 0.004 0.041   -0.070 -2.486 *** 0.009 0.315   
FX (gi,UK) -0.048 -0.342   0.078 1.892 * 0.081 2.088 ** 
FX (gi,US) -0.232 -1.981 ** 0.020 0.609   0.014 0.414   
FXV (zi,Japan) -0.003 -0.017   -0.004 -0.007   0.002 0.017   
FXV (zi,UK) -0.001 -0.004   -0.001 -0.008   -0.002 -0.003   
FXV (zi,US) 0.000 -0.023   0.002 0.006   0.000 0.005   
D*FX (i,Jaoan) 0.087 0.600   0.099 2.303 *** -0.177 -3.511 *** 
D*FX (i,UK) 0.063 0.325   0.073 1.312   -0.129 -2.062 ** 
D*FX (i,US) -0.083 -0.427   -0.013 -0.252   -0.019 -0.304   
D*FXV (i,Japan) -0.006 -0.009   0.008 0.004   0.001 0.003   
D*FXV (i,UK) -0.002 -0.011   0.001 0.008   -0.002 -0.004   
D*FXV (i,US) -0.002 -0.014   0.002 0.084   0.000 -0.013   
Variance Equation                   
ARCH (aii
2, Pre-Crisis) 0.000 0.053   0.000 0.159   0.002 0.084   
GARCH (bii
2, Pre-Crisis) 0.998 122.5
24 
*** 0.999 397.3
46 
*** 0.997 42.043 *** 
ARCH (aii
2, Post-Crisis) 0.042 3.125 *** 0.014 5.064 *** 0.091 6.942 *** 
GARCH (bii
2, Post-Crisis) 0.963 85.20
9 
*** 0.984 404.1
04 
*** 0.919 84.288 *** 
Persistence (Pre-Crisis) 0.999     0.999     0.999     
Persistence (Post-Crisis) 1.005     0.998     1.009     
Log-Likelihood 19978
.8 
                
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5.        VAR-BEKK Models for Large Banking Portfolios 
The table summarizes the estimated parameters from the VAR-BEKK model with conditional mean 
equation specified in Equation (1a).  Estimations are based onlarge banking portfolios from the 
Japanese and the U.S. market. 
 
                                                                                          
 
 Large Japanese Banks Large US Banks 
 Coeff. Z-Stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Mean Equation             
Constant 0.000 -0.860   0.000 -2.582 *** 
Market (,Market) 0.944 46.104 *** 0.980 47.184 *** 
IR (i,IR) 0.004 0.311   0.035 2.731 *** 
FX (gi,Japan) 0.012 0.218   -0.035 -0.930   
FX (gi,UK) 0.033 0.393   0.013 0.317   
FX (gi,US) -0.159 -2.413 *** -0.054 -1.367   
FXV (zi,Japan) -0.003 -0.012   -0.005 -0.032   
FXV (zi,UK) -0.003 -0.029   -0.001 -0.030   
FXV (zi,US) 0.000 -0.032   0.000 0.060   
D*FX (i,Jaoan) 0.130 1.640 * -0.270 -3.686 *** 
D*FX (i,UK) 0.009 0.075   -0.171 -1.775 * 
D*FX (i,US) 0.045 0.431   0.066 0.600   
D*FXV (i,Japan) -0.009 -0.015   -0.003 -0.031   
D*FXV (i,UK) -0.004 -0.009   -0.001 -0.020   
D*FXV (i,US) -0.004 -0.016   0.000 -0.022   
Variance Equation             
ARCH (aii
2, Pre-Crisis) 0.000 0.068   0.099 0.689   
GARCH (bii
2, Pre-Crisis) 1.004 234.180 *** 0.912 7.121 *** 
ARCH (aii
2, Post-Crisis) 0.069 6.792 *** 0.065 6.720 *** 
GARCH (bii
2, Post-Crisis) 0.936 114.730 *** 0.937 114.970 *** 
Persistence (Pre-Crisis) 1.004     1.011     
Persistence (Post-Crisis) 1.006     1.002     
Log-Likelihood 12791           
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6.        VAR-BEKK Models for Small Banking Portfolios 
The table summarizes the estimated parameters from the VAR-BEKK model with conditional mean 
equation specified in Equation (1a).  Estimations are based on small banking portfolios from the 
Japanese and the U.S. market. 
 
                                                                                          
 
 Small Japanese Banks Small US Banks 
 Coeff. Z-Stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
Mean Equation             
Constant 0.000 -0.862   0.000 -1.235   
Market (i,Market) 0.732 35.366 *** 0.309 31.239 *** 
IR (i,IR) 0.019 1.859 * 0.031 5.172 *** 
FX (gi,Japan) -0.018 -0.383   -0.018 -1.061   
FX (gi,UK) -0.028 -0.417   0.004 0.211   
FX (gi,US) -0.072 -1.104   -0.044 -2.333 *** 
FXV (zi,Japan) 0.003 0.026   0.005 0.029   
FXV (zi,UK) -0.002 -0.062   0.004 0.042   
FXV (zi,US) 0.001 0.032   0.007 0.027   
D*FX (i,Jaoan) 0.119 1.455   -0.195 -3.973 *** 
D*FX (i,UK) 0.047 0.497   -0.026 -0.469   
D*FX (i,US) -0.017 -0.167   -0.057 -0.931   
D*FXV (i,Japan) 0.001 0.044   0.004 0.067   
D*FXV (i,UK) -0.002 -0.040   0.001 0.050   
D*FXV (i,US) -0.002 -0.038   0.000 0.028   
Variance Equation             
ARCH (aii
2, Pre-Crisis) 0.004 -0.803   0.089 1.249   
GARCH (bii
2, Pre-Crisis) 0.999 211.970 *** 0.950 16.609 *** 
ARCH (aii
2, Post-Crisis) 0.053 4.873 *** 0.194 8.736 *** 
GARCH (bii
2, Post-Crisis) 0.952 110.880 *** 0.831 58.155 *** 
Persistence (Pre-Crisis) 1.004     1.040     
Persistence (Post-Crisis) 1.004     1.025     
Log-Likelihood 14394.0           
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level, respectively. 
 
 
